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Abstract
There is a specter haunting the American health care system. It is the prospect of widespread chronic illness
and disability in an aging society. With it comes a daunting challenge to our health care delivery system, social
welfare services, families, and communities. And it presents an equally difficult challenge to millions of us as
individuals. For prolonged, slowly debilitating chronic illnesses will most likely be our companions in the
twilight of our lives.
At present, it is unclear whether the American health care and social service systems are prepared to cope with
the challenges, both financial and ethical, that chronic illness poses to our society. Innovative policy ideas are
needed, as are continuing research, extended and better coordinated social senvice programs, and educational
programs that will equip health care providers to meet the special needs of persons with chronic illnesses.
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This Special Supplement was derived from The 
Hastings Center project on Ethics and Chronic 
Illness, which was supported by a grant from the 
Henry Luce Foundation. The Special Supplement 
was edited by Courtney S. Campbell. Contents 
copyright 1988 by The Hastings Center. All rights 
reserved. 
There is a specter haunting the American health care 
system. It is the prospect of widespread chronic illness and 
disability in an aging society. Mth it coma a daunting 
challenge to our health care delivery system, social welfare 
s&, familks, and communitks. And it presents an 
equally dzfJicult challenge to millions of us as individuals. 
For prolonged, slowly debilitating chronic illnesses will 
most likely be our companions in the twilight of our lives. 
At present, it is unclear whether the American health 
care and social service systems are prepared to cope with 
the challenges, both financial and ethical, that chronic 
illness poses to our sonety. Innovative policy ideas are 
needed, as are continuing research, extended and better 
coordinated social senvice programs, and educational 
programs that will equip health care providers to meet 
the special ma3of persons with chronic illnesses. 
The ethical dimensions of chronic illness and chronic 
care have been relatively neglected topics in the overall 
Jield of bioethics. Chronic care is a tedious, grinding labor 
of Stsyphus. It lacks the visibility and f dna t i on  of the 
high tech dramas played out in acute care settings. But 
the practical ethical dilemmas raised by chronic care are 
no h s  important than those in acute care, and the special 
c h a r b t i c s  of chronic illness make it an ideal domain 
in which to explore some neu ethical and philosophical 
appoaches. Chronic illness is not only a social issue that 
must be addressed, it is also a poignant and perplexing 
facet of the human condition where fiesh insight can be 
sought. Meeting the needs of those with chronic illness, 
and treating them with just& and dignity as full-jledged 
members of the moral community, will tax our common 
energies, the public purse, and our moral imagination. 
In 1984 The Hastings Center began a three-year project 
on Ethics and Chronic Illness with supportfim the Hen9 
Luce Foundation. The project was premised on the 
hypothesis that the spenal nature of chronic care and the 
distinctive experience of chronic illness may lead to a 
transformation in many peruasive assumptions about the 
ethics andgoals of medicine. The individualistic perspective 
behind much of the moral discourse of &ethics and social 
policy does not fare well in application to chronic illness 
and chronic care. Conc@ts such as patients' rights, 
autonomy, and best interests need to be revised in this 
context. In its confrontation with chronic i l l m ,  medicine's 
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own understanding of its goals and mission must also 
be redejned. Intensive, high technology treatmat oriented 
toward cure and fill  restoration of function, which has 
provided the dominant orientation for much of medicine 
in  recent years, is usually inapp-opnate to the needs and 
problems of the chronically ill. A medical care system that 
lacks a sense of purpose beyond these goals will j n d  itself 
increasingly uncmtain and inept in  the face of the demands 
placed upon it by chronic care. 
T h  report offered here grows out of the overall work 
of t h  Ethics and Chronic Illness Project. Chronic illness 
is an exceedingly broad subject, and it has been more 
dzfJicult than we imagined to capture a glimpse of the 
rich n m agendafor bioethics that chronic illness provides. 
We hope nonetheless to have outlined some of that agenda 
in a way that will stimulate others to r&ne and pursue 
it firther. 
We are most gratefil for the expert advia, pidunce, 
and support we received from the members of the project 
research group, and others who took part in  several 
meetings held during the past three years. Most of the 
project group members have m a r e d  their own papers 
and studies on various topxs touched upon in  the following 
pages. These studies comprise an already substantial body 
of original work in  t h  ethics of chronk illness, and we 
have drawn heavily upon them. An edited book containing 
these papers is currently being prepared for publication. 
It will save as a companion volume to this Special 
Supplement, and will be useful to those who wish to pursue 
in  more depth some of the points we have raised. 
We would like to thank the Henry Luce Foundation 
for providing thejfinancial support that made our project 
and this Special Supplement possibk 
Bruce Jennings 
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Arthur L. Caplan 
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b e v e r e  chronic illness is a domineering, unre- 
-
mitting presence in the lives of millions of 
Americans. Its onset, at whatever age, forces a 
revision of many hopes and expectations. When it 
first appears, chronic illness may seem like an 
unwelcome intruder, but eventually it becomes a part 
of oneself, still unwelcome, with which one must 
learn to live as best one can. In the years ahead 
chronic illness will enter the lives of more and more 
people-children and young adults who survive 
conditions once fatal in the first few months or years 
of life, and those over sixty-five who survive or avoid 
the acute illnesses of middle age. This will present 
an inescapable, possibly overwhelming problem for 
the American health care system. How we respond 
to chronic illness will be a litmus test for the character 
of American society. 
Comprehending chronic illness requires an 
appreciation of the multifaceted ways in which it 
affects the individual, the web of familial and social 
relationships surrounding each chronically ill 
person, and the overall system of health care and 
social welfare services. Underlying organic dysfunc- 
tion-chronic diseuse-is only one aspect of the total 
reality of chronic illness. The disease afflicts brains 
and bodies, the illness affects persons, and with them 
families and communities. Moreover, medical care 
is only one, and not always the most important, 
aspect of the social support and provision persons 
with chronic illness need in order to cope with the 
manifestations of their disease, manage the tasks 
of daily living, and maintain their independence 
and sense of self-worth. 
However, recognizing the multifaceted psycholog- 
ical, social, and ethical, as well as medical reality 
of chronic illness is only the first step. We still lack 
an adequate understanding of the meaning and 
ethical implications of chronic illness in the lives 
of individuals, families, and the broader society; and 
we lack as well a serviceable vocabulary of concepts 
and categories with which to address its meaning 
and implications. Above all, we lack a guiding vision 
of how a just and good society should accommodate 
the special needs of its chronically ill members, care 
for them, and support them in their quest to live 
meaningful, satisfying lives with-and in spite of- 
their chronic illness. At a time when a comprehen- 
sive public discussion of how to meet the present 
and future challenges posed by chronic illness is 
sorely needed, this lack of a guiding moral vision 
is a serious problem. 
The purpose of this report is to stimulate a broader 
discussion of the distinctive ethical issues posed by 
chronic illness, and to outline an agenda for future 
bioethical investigation in this area. Concomitantly, 
our aim is to articulate at least the rudiments of 
a guiding moral vision that comes from both learning 
about chronic illness and learningfiom i t  A guiding 
moral vision is needed to focus the efforts of 
individual caregivers, families, support groups, 
advocacy organizations, and local communities. It 
is needed to make the growing presence of chronic 
illness in our midst an occasion for strengthening 
the ties of mutual respect, benevolence, and caring 
between young and old, sick and well, in families 
and communities. Finally, on the national stage, a 
new moral perspective can help to inform a broad 
public consensus about the appropriate goals of 
chronic care and to give direction to public policies. 
A Challenge for Bioethics 
Preventing or curing chronic illness is certainly 
better than living with it, both for the individual 
and for society as a whole. It is tempting to assimilate 
chronic illness to the currently prevailing outlook 
of acute care medicine, seeing it as yet one more 
frontier for science and technology to conquer and 
to cure. As desirable as primary prevention and cure 
may be in the abstract, however, an exclusive 
emphasis on such objectives overlooks the full 
dimensions of the problem. Over time it may indeed 
be possible to limit the incidence of some chronic 
diseases and to ameliorate their effects. With an 
aging population though, it is virtually certain that 
the prevalence of chronic illness will increase 
dramatically between now and the middle of the 
next century, as the postwar baby boom becomes 
the "elderly boom" beginning in 2010. 
Medicine's historic response to infectious disease 
and acute, self-limiting diseases of short duration 
does not offer an adequate way of understanding 
or responding to the personal, social, and ethical 
challenges posed by chronic illness and disability. 
What is needed, instead, is a different conception 
of the proper ends of medicine in the face of chronic 
illness, and beyond that, a better understanding of 
the human and social meaning of chronic illness. 
The task of bioethics includes clarification of such 
issues. However, much of the moral discourse of 
contemporary bioethics is oriented by problems in 
acute care, and thus may overlook the distinctive 
issues raised by chronic illness and chronic care. 
There are two principal reasons for this. First, 
bioethics has been centered upon-and has helped 
to construct-an individualistic moral perspective in 
which the promotion of individual autonomy and 
the protection of individual interests are the 
paramount ethical goals. Second, while this 
emphasis on autonomy has overthrown some of the 
paternalistic attitudes traditionally associated with 
the so-called medical model, it has not fundamen- 
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tally alteredthe medical model's basic understanding 
of the nature of illness and the goals of care. This 
individualistic perspective and this continued 
attachment to the underlying assumptions of the 
medical model comprise what we shall refer to as 
the "autonomy paradigm" in bioethics. 
Our thesis is that the autonomy paradigm is 
inadequate for chronic care, and that the develop 
ment of a new bioethics of chronic illness is needed. 
It should begin with a recognition of the challenges 
chronic illness poses to many widespread value 
assumptions and institutionalized practices within 
and outside the health care system.Three challenges 
in particular merit special attention: 
Chronic illness poses a challenge to our 
understanding of the ends of medicine, the nature 
of the physician-patient relationship, and the ethical 
principles and standards governing health care 
decisionmaking. 
Chronic illness challenges the normal moral 
boundaries of caring,and conventional expectations 
about the caregiving duties of the family in relation 
to the social welfare obligations of the state. 
Chronic illness challenges our understanding 
of socialjustice and community, as these ideals are 
reflected in society's response to different kinds of 
health care and social service needs. 
Definitions 
Chronic illness may be defined as a condition 
that lasts for a substantial period of time or has 
sequelae that are debilitating for a long period of 
time. It is also commonly defined as a condition 
that interferes with daily functioning for more than 
three months in a year, causes hospitalization for 
thirty days or more per year, or (attime of diagnosis) 
is likely to do either of these. 
Defined generally in these ways, chronic illness 
includes a very broad spectrum of diseases that differ 
significantly from one another in their underlying 
causes, modes of treatment, symptoms, and effects 
on a person's life and activity. Some prevalent 
chronic conditions are life-threatening,such as heart 
disease, cancer, and stroke; others, such as arthritis, 
gout, epilepsy, and chronic sinusitis, are not. Some, 
like insulin dependent diabetes, cystic fibrosis, and 
muscular dystrophy are marked by early onset; 
others are primarily diseases of old age, like 
Alzheimer's disease, arteriosclerosis, emphysema, 
and osteoporosis. Conditions such as spina bifida, 
multiple sclerosis, Parkinson's disease, and Alzhei-
mer's disease, have a devastating effect on one's 
life, while conditions such as hypertension, asthma, 
and ulcers can be controlled without undue 
disruption in normal activities. Overall, chronic 
diseasesvary greatly in their developmentalcourse-
some conditions improve over time, some stabilize, 
and others are progressively degenerating and 
debilitating. Moreover, within specific disease 
categories individuals vary tremendously in the 
severity of their impairment and in their ability to 
manage their illness. 
In this report, we shall explore the ethical and 
social meaning of severe chronic illness amid the 
kaleidoscopic diversity of chronic illnesses. We 
intend to identify the common human needs and 
experiences that emerge in the encounter with 
severe chronic illness, and to examine generic 
ethical problems present in a range of different 
conditions. This task requires a more specific and 
unified focus than the broader definitions men-
tioned above permit. Accordingly, we will concen-
trate primarily on organically based, severe chronic 
conditions that lead to signijcant loss of function or 
disability and generally have a slowly but p-ogressively 
debilitating course. 
The group of illnesses distinguished by this 
emphasis on duration, severity, and progressive 
debilitation is still quite large, but share many 
common characteristics. They involve the greatest 
personal hardships and the heaviest financial costs 
for medical care. Aside from chronic mental illness, 
which would require a separate study and another 
report to address adequately,these are the conditions 
most in need of fresh ethical analysis and new policy 
strategies. Though these illnesses can be medically 
managed and their development slowed (a process 
sometimes referred to as "secondary prevention"), 
they cannot be "cured in the sense of being 
physiologically arrested or fully compensated for. 
Typically, the long-term course of such conditions 
can be foreseen,but the pace and daily manifestation 
of symptoms in individual patients is highly variable 
and uncertain. Finally, many if not all of the severe 
chronic conditions we will be concerned with are 
accompanied by intermittent acute episodes and 
other treatable problems. Thus most of the care and 
management of severe chronic conditions takes 
place outside the hospital setting, but persons with 
these conditions will have an abnormally high 
number of hospital days, physician visits, and 
restricted activity days per year; and they will require 
some assistance with the activities of daily living and 
eventually a substantial amount of nursing and 
custodial care, either in an institutional setting or 
in the community. 
Elderly Boom, Chronic Care Avalanche 
At least since the 1930s, chronic illness has been 
perceived as the principal health care challenge of 
Hastings Center Report, February/March 1988 
our time. The challenge has not diminished in the 
last fifty years. Chronic care for all who need it in 
an aging society will place enormous demands on 
an already exceedingly costly health care system. 
Now and in the future it may be said that virtually 
everyone will suffer from a chronic illness at some 
time during their lives. But in the vast majority of 
cases the illness will not be severe enough to alter 
drastically the person's normal activities or to require 
excessive utilization of health care services. 
A useful focus on the problems created by severe 
chronic illness can be gained through data on 
morbidity and limitation of daily activities contained 
in the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) 
begun in 1957. In the late 1960s questions 
concerning the prevalence of specific chronic 
diseases were added to the survey. NHIS and similar 
data show trends indicating a general pattern of 
decreasing mortality and rising morbidity for middle- 
aged and older people since 1957, with particularly 
marked changes occurring in the 1970s. 
In 1984 approximately 24 percent of those 
reporting chronic illness also reported moderate or 
major limitations in their activities. The current 
prevalence of severe chronic illness in the 
population as a whole is difficult to gauge. Moderate 
estimates place the figure at approximately thirty 
million people. Moreover, both the incidence and 
the prevalence of all types of chronic illness are 
positively correlated with increasing age, and rise 
to particularly high levels in the population over 
sixty-five. Of those aged sixty-five to sixty-nine in 
1984,31.8 percent had a limitation in a major activity 
and 16.9 percent were unable to carry on a major 
activity. For the elderly population the leading 
chronic health problems are arthritis (36 percent 
of men; 50 percent of women), hearing impairments 
(33 percent and 25 percent), hypertension (32 
percent and 43 percent), heart disease (26 percent 
and 28 percent), and chronic sinusitis (14 percent 
and 17 percent). 
While the increase in the prevalence of chronic 
illness during the past twenty years has been 
troublesome enough, the truly staggering problems 
still lie ahead. The demographics of an aging 
population virtually ensure a chronic care avalanche. 
The institutional and financial implications of this 
for the health care system are enormous. In addition, 
the prospects for competition among age groups for 
limited public benefits and scarce economic 
resources are sobering. 
In 1900 4.1 percent of the U.S. population (3.1 
million people) were over sixty-five. By 1984 that 
number had grown to 28 million people or 11.9 
percent of the population, and proportionally the 
largest areas of increase were among the "old old" 
(seventy-five to eighty-four) and the "very old" 
(eighty-five and above). Moreover, people over 
seventy-five will become an increasingly significant 
factor in our society as their numbers increase both 
in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total 
population. The baby boom cohort is now an 
upwardly moving bulge in the pyramid-shaped graph 
of age distribution in the United States. The aging 
of the baby boomers, together with slowly rising birth 
rates and more rapidly declining mortality rates at 
all ages, will transform this triangle into a rectangle 
by the middle of the next century. 
The effect of these demographic changes upon 
the health care system will depend largely upon the 
age of onset of severe chronic diseases and 
disabilities affecting the elderly. Some analysts 
believe that future lifestyle changes and more 
effective medical prevention and treatment will make 
the average age of onset increase more quickly than 
life expectancy, thereby producing a "compression 
of morbidity" in which the duration of chronic 
illnesses before death will be less than it is now. 
This relatively optimistic scenario rests on shaky 
epidemiological grounds, as well as expectations of 
widespread changes in health related behavior, 
something which is notoriously difficult to predict 
or control. At any rate, the hope of making chronic 
illness less chronic is a very risky assumption upon 
which to base future health policy planning. For 
the moment, it seems wiser to be guided by less 
optimistic scenarios, and to anticipate nearly 
threefold increases in the number of physician visits, 
hospital admissions, and nursing home placements 
that the elderly will require between now and 2040. 
Policy Challenges 
The past record of policy regarding chronic care 
does not suggest that our political and policy 
processes are well equipped to meet the challenges 
that lie ahead. During the last two decades some 
progress has been made in providing needed 
financial assistance and services for the chronically 
ill. But individual patients, families, and private 
charitable organizations still bear a heavy share of 
the financial and in-kind costs of chronic care, while 
publicly funded health care entitlement programs 
and social welfare safety nets remain fragmented 
and uneven in their coverage. In 1984 the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that Med- 
icare enrollees paid on average more than $1,000 
annually in out-of-pocket medical expenses (for 
deductibles, cost-sharing, and noninstitutional care, 
such as prescription drugs,not covered by Medicare). 
When nursing home care is accounted for, the 
average annual out-of-pocket expense rises to $1,705. 
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Moreover, the burdens of chronic illness still fall 
most heavily on the low income elderly, the medically 
indigent and uninsured, the working poor, women, 
and minority groups. Data gathered in 1977 reveal 
that poor and near poor elderly persons with severe 
chronic conditions (those living at home with annual 
health care bills over $2,500) had to devote a large 
share of their household income to out-of-pocket 
expenses. Those eligible for both Medicare and 
Medicaid had to spend 10 percent of their income; 
for those relying on Medicare alone the figure rose 
to a staggering 53 percent In the 1980s and beyond, 
the future needs of the chronically ill are on a direct 
collision course with the goal of health care cost 
containment and a general dismantling of welfare 
state services. 
In fact there is not now, and never has been, 
a public policy strategy designed to address chronic 
illness as such. By and large, chronic illness has 
been responded to in an indirect fashion, as it is 
associated with other categorical factors such as age, 
poverty, or work related disability. The traditional 
lack of a comprehensive chronic illness policy is 
perhaps related to the fact that political advocacy 
groups have organized around specific diseases. 
Each chronic disease has its own subcommunity of 
medical and scientific experts, its own network of 
treatment centers, advocacy groups, celebrity 
spokespersons and fundraisers, and its special 
champions in Congress. Unfortunately, instead of 
finding common cause in the generic needs of the 
chronically ill, these groups are more often busy 
competing against one another for scarce research, 
health care, and social welfare dollars. 
This state of affairs is understandable enough. 
It reflects the long-standing pattern of interest group 
pluralism and the ideology of government-as-the- 
last-resort that characterize the American political 
system. It also indicates that chronic illnesses are 
highly diverse in their physiological causes, 
treatments, prognoses, and effects. Their victims 
often have little in common politically, economically, 
or culturally aside from age and the experience of 
disease itself. This results in a "disease of the month" 
health policy sweepstakes; its winners are those 
conditions afflicting very large numbers of citizens 
(cancer), genetic diseases affecting a well defined 
or powerfill ethnic constituency (sickle cell anemia 
and cystic fibrosis), and conditions that are medically 
"interesting" and lend themselves to something akin 
to cure in terms of the acute care medical model 
(chronic heart, liver, and kidney disease). 
This is one reason why we believe it is important 
to focus more attention on the common, generic 
problems and effects of chronic illness, and on the 
shared needs of the chronically ill population as 
a whole. As a prelude to a new politics of chronic 
health policy, this focus on the generic aspects of 
the chronic illness experience can provide a more 
sharply defined, coherent sense of the ethical issues 
that are distinctive to chronic illness, but do not 
simply arise in the treatment of a specific disease 
or disability. Medically, persons with arthritis, 
diabetes, multiple sclerosis, cystic fibrosis, and 
Alzheimer's disease may have little or nothing in 
common. But ethically, socially, and in the end 
politically too, their common interests and needs 
may be much more significant than their differences. 
The Experience of Chronic Illness 
For the individual perhaps the most salient 
general feature of chronic illness is the transfor- 
mation it causes in the texture of personal and social 
life. The person with chronic illness is thrust into 
unfamiliar and often inhospitable worlds-frequent 
hospital stays and encounters with highly complex, 
impersonal, and often frightening modes of acute 
medical treatment; prolonged and inconvenient 
regimens of medication, special exercise, and 
restricted diet; a continuing round of bureaucratic 
hassles with a disjointed system of medical and social 
service professionals and agencies; the daily prospect 
of sometimes disabling pain; the perpetual uncer- 
tainty that comes from the intermittent flair-ups of 
debilitating symptoms and the occasional onslaught 
of an acute, life-threatening episode. 
Chronic illness also threatens the integrity of more 
familiar aspects of a person's life. It punctuates one's 
life with frequent periods of restricted activity, 
immobility, and unwanted dependency on others. 
It often interferes with the ability to work, which 
threatens the person's basic livelihood and 
economic security, to say nothing of more ambitious 
career plans. Chronic illness and disability are often 
stigmatizing; intolerance, fear, and misunderstand- 
ing, at one extreme, and well meaning but 
humiliating and patronizing sympathy at the other 
often greet the chronically ill in their everyday social 
lives. Lost friendships, withdrawal and isolation, and 
an emotionally draining struggle to sustain dignity 
and self-respect are often the consequence. 
Cutting even more deeply into the person's life, 
chronic illness also transforms intimate and family 
relationships, placing new burdens on both the 
person who needs special care and family caregivers 
whose own lives and hopes must often be drastically 
revised to accommodate such needs. 
Chronic Illness and t h  Self 
Finally, it is important to understand the ways in 
which chronic illness can shape or transform the 
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person's self-identity. The impact of chronic illness 
on a person's self-image and sense of meaning and 
purpose in life can be either beneficial o r  
detrimental, and in many cases it is both. The ordeal 
of chronic illness can be experienced as an enabling 
experience, one  that sharpens the person's 
appreciation of remaining powers and abilities, 
quickens sensibilities and talents that had been 
dormant, and brings out a depth and strength of 
character previously untapped and unrealized. 
Alternatively, along with social stigma and isolation, 
chronic illness can leave the individual bereft of 
purpose and deeply alienated from the condition 
of his or her own body and the truncated future 
possibilities of life. 
Above all, the relationship between chronic illness 
and self-identity is a dynamic one. It is affected by 
many variables, including current symptoms of the 
disease, the reactions of family, friends, and 
caregivers, and the various strategies individuals use 
to sustain themselves. As sociologist Kathy Charmaz 
observes: "Realizing a preferred identity and 
possessing a valued self is a constant struggle for 
those with serious illnesses.. . . Illness forces people 
to experiment, adapt, and reorganize in order to 
maintain control over themselves and their lives. 
In this sense chronically ill people are innovators." 
Chronic illness raises exceedingly complex 
philosophical questions about the nature of the self 
and the continuity-or discontinuity-of self-identity 
over time amid changes in organic capacity, social 
circumstances, and in the ability to actively shape 
and direct one's life. Is the self an entity that stands 
above and apart from the body and the social 
persona so that even drastic changes in body or 
persona leave the essential identity of the self 
unchanged? Or, at the other extreme, is the self 
so constituted by the organic condition of the body 
and external social perceptions, that in the face of 
progressively debilitating and disabling chronic 
disease it may be said to have no essential stability 
at all? 
While an adequate position on the relation 
between a concept of self and the impact of chronic 
illness is difficult to formulate, reflection on such 
issues is important because of their relevance for 
ethical and policy questions. Philosophical assump- 
tions about the nature of the self stand behind most 
of the central ethical principles we use to direct the 
ends and procedures of health care, and also inform 
the goals we set in fashioning social policy and in 
designing the structure of the health and social 
service delivery system. Without understanding how 
the self is affected by the experience of living with- 
and in spite of-chronic illness, we will not be able 
to say with any specificity how the basic principles 
of respect for persons, patient autonomy, and the 
duty to promote wellbeing should apply to chronic 
care, nor how to specify the needs, rights, and 
interests of persons with chronic illness. We will lack 
a framework for adequately addressing how the 
chronically ill should be served by policies of health 
care financing, the design of institutional arrange- 
ments for medical and social services delivery, and 
the allocation of scarce resources. 
In contemporary society, chronic illness is a dark 
thread woven through the fabric of our lives; virtually 
everyone who lives a normal life span will undergo 
some type of chronic illness, and virtually everyone 
will be related to, love, work with, and care for 
someone who is chronically ill. Chronic illness thus 
has a significance that is at once uniquely personal 
and universally human. It creates special needs and 
vulnerabilities that set individuals and families apart, 
and it also creates a common bond among us in 
the reminder it provides of the inescapable fragility 
of the human condition. It generates conflict, but 
also the possibility of concord. 
Chronic illness calls for a particularly careful and 
sensitive kind of moral reflection. We must somehow 
acknowledge the distinctive needs and interests of 
the chronically ill, without thereby treating them like 
a special class or cutting them off from common 
membership in our moral community. We must 
provide needed health care services without turning 
the chronically ill into a dependent, institutionalized 
clientele of the health care professions. We must 
support families and voluntary communities that 
provide assistance with the activities of daily living 
and supplement these efforts with publicly funded 
programs. But we must do so without eroding the 
special sense of familial obligation that is still 
powerful in our society despite changing lifestyles 
and family patterns, and without transforming 
personal care into an impersonal commodity that 
is merely bought and sold. Our social policies must 
be guided by ideals of justice and compassion and 
a due sense of the public entitlements that the 
chronically ill should possess as a matter of right, 
while at the same time setting reasonable limits 
on the claims persons with chronic illness can 
make. 
A full discussion of these objectives, and the 
policies for attaining them, is well beyond our 
capacity in this essay. As a starting point for further 
research and discussion, though, we believe it is 
useful to begin with currently prevailing ethical 
frameworks in three domains-the professional 
ethics of medicine, the ethics of family relationships, 
and notions of socialjustice that inform public policy. 
We will explore the implications of chronic illness 
in each of these contexts. 
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Toward a Bioethics of Chronic Illness 
Chronic medical care has a number of distinctive 
characteristics. Most chronic care does not involve 
complex diagnostic procedures or invasive interven- 
tions and monitoring under direct supervision of 
a physician in a hospital setting, but rather long- 
term drug and rehabilitative therapies that must 
largely be camed out by patients themselves, with 
only periodic monitoring and adjustments by 
professionals. The compliance and involvement of 
patients are crucial to the efficacy of most forms 
of chronic care. When these factors are affected 
by the patient's home environment and family 
support, as is typically the case, the family also 
becomes integral to the care. 
For the physician this raises delicate ethical 
questions concerning issues of privacy, confidential- 
ity, and patient autonomy. How much should family 
members be told about the diagnosis and prognosis 
of a chronic illness, and when? If family members 
must have direct involvement in the implementation 
of a treatment regimen, do they have a right to be 
involved in deciding among alternative possible 
treatment plans? Where should the line be drawn 
between justifiable paternalism and unacceptable 
manipulation and coercion when physicians and 
family members attempt to modiQ the behavior of 
a noncompliant patient? 
T h  Autonomy Paradigm 
During the past two decades a systematic 
conceptual framework for understanding the ethical 
dimensions of medical decisionmaking has been 
gradually constructed and relied upon by those 
involved in the study of bioethics. Although a 
considerable gap still exists between bioethical 
theory and actual medical practice, the importance 
of the bioethics movement should not be under- 
estimated. Drawing on expertise within the health 
care professions, as well as work in philosophy, 
theology, law, and the social sciences, bioethics offers 
an influential view of what medicine is and should 
be-what human values it can and should serve, 
what legal and public policy frameworks should 
govern it, and what institutional forms it should take. 
Three interrelated notions form the conceptual 
infrastructure of most contemporary bioethics and 
constitute what we shall call the "autonomy 
paradigm." The first component of the autonomy 
paradigm is a particular interpretation of the 
meaning of illness and the goal of medicine: illness 
is seen as an alien threat to the self, and the goal 
is to defend and restore the self by curing or 
compensating for the illness. This notion is often 
referred to as "the medical model" of illness. 
The second component of the autonomy para- 
digm is a particular understanding of the role of 
the patient and the nature of the physician-patient 
relationship. According to this view, which is often 
called the "contractual model" of medical care, the 
patient is a rational, self-interested subject who, 
threatened by illness, voluntarily enters into a 
contractual agreement with a physician (or other 
health care provider) and temporarily submits 
himself or herself to medical authority in order to 
combat the illness. 
A decidedly individualistic conception of the 
person is the third component of the autonomy 
paradigm. In this view, self-identity, autonomy, and 
interests are conceptually prior to and independent 
of the encounter with illness and the experience 
of participation in the caregiving process. This 
individualistic conception of the person is the 
linchpin that connects the medical model, the 
contractual model, and the commitment in main- 
stream bioethics to promoting the autonomy and 
best interests (wellbeing) of the patient 
Although it is not often conceptualized in precisely 
this form, we believe that the autonomy paradigm 
underlies most public discussions of health care, and 
is an intellectual force to be reckoned with. It has 
become "institutionalized" in health care delivery 
through the influence of court rulings, government 
regulations, and organizational policies in hospitals 
and other health care facilities. Equally important, 
it has become the predominant framework for 
reflection about how we should respond morally 
to future health care needs and how future public 
policies that will enable the health care system to 
meet those needs should be devised. 
Does this paradigm provide a serviceable 
framework for understanding the ethical dimensions 
of chronic illness? We argue that it does not As 
one's attention shifts from acute care and medicine's 
attack on curable disease to chronic care and 
medicine's contribution to the quality of life lived 
with chronic illness, the medical model and the 
contractual model require substantial revision. 
Above all, chronic illness provides a context in which 
the shortcomings and limitations of an individualistic 
conception of the person become particularly 
apparent 
Disease as t h  Enemy 
It is generally recognized that serious acute illness 
poses a threat to the individual, and morally requires 
others to assist the individual in counteracting that 
threat In instances of life-threatening emergencies, 
and in most cases of acute care medicine even when 
the condition is not immediately life-threatening, the 
person's needs, the proper actions for the physician 
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to take in response to those needs, and the scope 
of the moral rights and responsibilities of the parties 
involved are all reasonably clear. By and large with 
acute illness-pneumococcal pneumonia is a good 
example-the source of the threat can be singled 
out and identified-the invading organism, the 
disease process, the biochemical malfunction. In 
acute care establishing the correct diagnosis is more 
than half the battle, for it is on that basis that the 
remaining course of treatment usually proceeds. 
Having identified the threat, it is also easy to 
identify what is threatened-life, health, a level of 
"normal" functioning that can be restored to the 
statm quo ante. Moreover, the threat is viewed as 
evil because life, health, and function are intrinsic 
values or primary human goods; they are the 
foundation for the pursuit of all our other ends. 
Finally, physicians know how to respond to the 
threat-the range of appropriate medical treatments 
is determined by the current state of medical 
knowledge, and perhaps there will be one specific 
intervention, a "magic bullet," that will eliminate the 
threat once and for all. 
The central theme of the medical model is thus 
the idea of illness as a threat that suddenly intrudes 
upon a preexisting condition of health and wellbeing. 
This perspective supports the military metaphors 
commonplace in our cultural ideology of medicine. 
Disease is the enemy within. The patient and physician 
enter an "alliance" in which the technical "armamen- 
tarium" of medicine is used to defend the patient and 
to attack the invader. Restoration of the status of the 
person prior to the illness-cure-is the objective 
sought in the campaign. 
Seeing the illness as a threatening intruder serves 
to externalize and objectify it, and makes the illness 
a thing, extrinsic and foreign to the person even 
though it is inside the body. Illness represents a 
temporary unfreedom imposed upon the person by 
an alien source, a heteronomy that thwarts self- 
determination and the pursuit of life's "normal" 
goals. Similarly, illness undermines wellbeing 
because wellbeing is taken to be, as the term implies, 
a state of being well without-not in spite of-illness; 
a state of being for which illness is an Other. 
The Patient Role and the Medical Contract 
Individuals confronted with acute illness generally 
define their needs and interests in the same way 
that the medical model defines them, thereby 
collaborating with their physicians in a common 
endeavor to cure the disease and to restore health 
and function. Acutely ill persons submit themselves 
to medical authority as "patients," a role that is often 
taken to imply passivity, but in fact might better be 
described as one of active cooperation and 
compliance. In the context of acute care, the patient 
role is warranted. Even though it places one under 
external authority, it can be justified on grounds 
of prudence: it furthers the person's own goals, it 
is a temporary, self-limiting status and the person 
regards the acute illness as an extrinsic threat to 
his or her being rather than as a constitutive feature 
of it. 
In recent years an emphasis on truthtelling, 
informed consent, and a generally more active role 
by patients (or their designated surrogates) in the 
process of medical decisionmaking-all in the name 
of individual self-determination or autonomy-has 
tended to set aside benevolent paternalism and 
professional expertise as the basis for physician 
authority. In their place, bioethics has substituted 
the notion of rational, voluntary consent to medical 
care and medical authority. This development of 
a normative framework for medicine is remarkably 
akin to the classical liberal contractarian account 
of political authority and obligation. Bioethics has, 
in essence, imported liberal individualism into the 
health care arena. Under the autonomy paradigm, 
therefore, the provider-patient relationship is viewed 
as contractual in nature. It is the social contract of 
the liberal polity writ small-a structure of reciprocal 
rights and obligations voluntarily entered into by 
both parties in order to achieve goals together that 
neither party acting alone could achieve. 
This framework, while holding potentially 
significant practical implications, has probably been 
more influential in challenging a certain paternal- 
istic and authoritarian style of medical practice than 
in challenging the basic medical model and patient 
role notions. Medical authority based upon rational 
("competent") patient consent is still medical 
authority. A patient-centered ethic of autonomy may 
be empowering and rights-enhancing for the 
individual, but it remains a perspective focused on 
the role of patient, and makes certain unanalyzed 
assumptions about the relationship between that role 
and the other roles in a person's life. Adding respect 
for patient autonomy to the promotion of patient 
wellbeing (beneficence) as a principled obligation 
of health care providers still leaves the cure of disease 
and the restoration of function as the central ends 
of medicine, in so far as these goals provide the 
rationale for the decision of autonomous agents to 
enter into the role of patient in the first place. 
Moreover, the moral injunctions of the Hippocratic 
tradition-use medical knowledge and skills only 
for the benefit of the patient (beneficence) and do 
no harm (nonmaleficence)-can readily be accom- 
modated to the newer moral emphasis on individual 
autonomy so long as "benefit" and "harm" are 
interpreted broadly enough to encompass the 
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patient's own values, beliefs, and conceptions of the 
good, as well as his or her bodily needs. 
In short, the autonomy paradigm has both 
solidified a strongly individualistic, patient-centered 
orientation in medicine, and preserved the basic 
assumptions about the ends of medicine that inform 
the medical model and the contractual model in 
the context of acute care. The acute care "bias" of 
mainstream bioethics is thus not simply a function 
of the fact that most work in bioethics has 
concentrated on cases and problems arising in 
institution-based acute care settings. That bias, which 
has served bioethics well and has been quite 
appropriate in many discussions, is deeply 
embedded in the conceptual structure of the 
autonomy paradigm. 
How Is Chronic Care Different? 
Earlier we noted a number of factors that make 
chronic care different from acute care-the reduced 
emphasis on diagnostic investigation, comparatively 
less understanding of the etiology and biologic 
pathways of the disease process, the variability and 
uncertainty of clinical symptoms, the lack of constant 
medical supervision and the reliance on the patient 
and family members to cany out long-term drug 
and rehabilitative therapies, and the manifest lack 
of magic bullets to cure the illness. These factors 
suggest some obvious ways in which the acute care 
medical model fails to describe-or to guide-
chronic care. 
With chronic conditions, by and large, illness 
cannot be conceptualized as an alien presence 
within the person, or as an aberrant situation that 
marks a temporary, reversible departure from the 
person's "normal" state. Chronic care must proceed 
from the recognition that chronic illness is a 
component of the person's overall state of being. 
Depending upon the specific chronic disease, 
medical therapy offers a variety of different effects, 
ranging from remission or slowing the progress of 
the disease to artificially compensating for impair- 
ments and managing symptoms. These therapies 
share an objective to help people accommodate 
themselves to the chronic illness, which cannot be 
vanquished or eliminated. The overall goal of 
chronic care is to mitigate the limitations that chronic 
illness inevitably brings with it in a person's life, 
and to control the damage that the illness might 
otherwise do. More specific, clinically defined goals 
such as rehabilitation, pain relief, and the control 
of symptoms through drug therapy, diet, and 
exercise, are consonant with this end. 
In the face of chronic illness the paramount good 
that medicine should serve is not precisely health- 
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at least not ideal health, which is a chimera in any 
case-but rather the wholeness and the integrity 
of the self. Persons with chronic illness really have 
no choice but to try to integrate their illness 
constructively into their daily lives and sense of self- 
identity. The desideratum is to stay intact-to make 
the necessary adjustments with as little loss of 
purpose, coherence, and meaning in life as possible. 
Indeed, they may be able to replace former plans 
and aspirations with even more fulfilling new ones. 
Living with chronic illness is thus a process of 
negotiation. As sociologist Anselm Strauss points out, 
such a process involves many kinds of hard work- 
the work of controlling a sometimes irascible body, 
the work of managing one's biography or self-
identity, the work of orchestrating the presentation 
of self in everyday life. 
Whereas acute care aims to restore one's freedom 
from illness, the goal of chronic care is to sustain 
meaning in life lived with-and in spite of-illness. 
Diplomacy is perhaps a better metaphor than 
warfare for this kind of care. Medicine's role in 
chronic care is to facilitate the process of nego- 
tiation. 
Many people experience a period of anger and 
denial when their chronic illness is first diagnosed 
or its symptoms first appear. It is tembly difficult 
and unsettling to recognize chronic illness as 
something to negotiate with rather than as an 
invader to be defeated. But over time most people 
find that separating themselves from their illness 
is not a viable or satisfying response to their 
condition; they must work through the phase of 
denial to a more constructive kind of reconciliation, 
without moving to the opposite extreme of defeatism 
and undue dependency. 
Part of the task of medical care and counseling 
is to assist persons with chronic illness as they ride 
this emotional roller coaster. At one stage of 
psychological adjustment to their illness it is not 
uncommon for persons with chronic illness to 
become extremely passive and dependent upon their 
health care providers, or other caregivers. On the 
other hand, the long duration of chronic illness and 
many years of experience with a particular form 
of medical therapy make chronically ill persons 
much more knowledgeable about their condition 
than acute care patients tend to be, or even some 
of the physicians they see. 
Chronic illness tends to foster a wide variety of 
styles and stages of being a patient. No single model 
of the patient role can capture the diversity and 
dynamism of chronic care adequately. It elicits an 
equally diverse set of relationships with physicians. 
In this setting, the rationalistic quid pro quo of the 
contractual model seems thin and unrealistic. 
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Embodied Autonomy 
These considerations suggest new ways of 
thinking about the role of being a patient, the nature 
of the physician-patient relationship, and the ethical 
values, especially individual autonomy, that should 
inform that relationship. 
The traditional paternalistic model of care cast 
theperson aspatient into a largely passive and obedient 
role. More recently the autonomy paradigm has 
emphasized respect for the patient as a person, a more 
equal and active partner in the process of medical 
decisionmaking and health care. But the person or 
self in the autonomy paradigm is taken to be an 
entity separate from and independent of the illness, 
with preestablished interests that are also indepen- 
dent of the illness. As a practical matter, individuals 
with chronic illness are rarely, if ever, "patients" in 
either of these senses. 
The contractual model of the physician-patient 
relationship is based, as we have seen, on the idea 
that the principal goal of patients is to protect their 
interests-to protect them from the illness that 
threatens them and to protect them from the 
illegitimate or paternalistic exercise of medical 
authority. According to this account, a person's interests 
are fixed, stable over time and set prior to the person's 
encounter with illness. However, even if this notion 
of interests may fit the situation of acute care (we 
would question whether it does), it is exceedingly 
problematic in the realm of chronic illness. 
Interests may be defined subjectively as conditions 
of existence that the person finds valuable and wants 
to obtain. Alternatively, interests may be defined 
objectively as those conditions of existence that do 
in fact enhance the person's good and wellbeing. 
Chronic illness transforms interests in either sense; 
subjectively by altering the person's sense of self, 
and his or her possibilities and limitations, and 
objectively by altering the conditions necessary for 
wellbeing and human flourishing. The primary 
obligation of chronic care medicine, then, is not 
to protect the person's interests in the sense of 
keeping them from being affected by illness-that 
is impossible-but rather to assist the person in 
keeping the transformative power of illness under 
control, to integrate new subjective interests (wants) 
and new objective interests (needs) into a coherent 
and satisfying life. 
The issue of compliance with a prescribed course 
of treatment, for example, a drug or dietary regimen, 
illustrates this. Compliance with a treatment program 
to which informed consent has been given is clearly 
one of the patient's duties according to the 
contractual model. In the abstract, rationalistic world 
where this model is most at home, compliance is 
obviously in the patient's best interest, to the extent 
that persistent noncompliance is taken as prima facie 
evidence of the patient's lack of decisionmaking 
capacity, and a symptom of denial or maladjustment. 
This interpretation may be correct in many cases, 
but as a generalized account it has serious blind 
spots and overlooks a much more complex drama 
often played out in chronic care. Persons with 
chronic illness must manage their illness socially 
and psychologically as well as medically; they must 
strive to prevent the illness from overwhelming their 
sense of efficacy and the control they, like all of 
us, wish to exercise over their lives and activities. 
Interactions with health care providers are one scene 
in this drama of self-assertion and control. 
Noncompliance-or better, patient-determined 
compliance-with medical orders is one negotiating 
strategy that persons with chronic illness use to 
achieve their social and psychological objectives, 
even at the expense of optimal attainment of their 
medical goals. 
If, as we have argued, chronic care is more about 
negotiating with illness than about combatting 
disease, then the duties of the physician must also 
be rethought in this broader context. Respect for 
patient autonomy does not dictate a straightfornard 
course of action when the physician is faced with 
a noncompliant patient in chronic care. Physicians 
should be more sensitive to the meaning and 
purpose of such behavior, but it does not follow 
from this that they simply have a duty to acquiesce 
in this particular style and patient strategy. 
Acquiescence is not necessarily respectful of 
autonomy, and attempts to modify the patient's 
behavior do not necessarily reflect a presumptuous, 
disrespectful kind of paternalism. Managing the 
illness in a self-affirming way is-or should be- 
the common goal of the physician and the 
chronically ill person. The question for caregivers, 
then, is whether they can help the patient design 
some other, less medically harmful, coping strategy 
that will achieve the same psychic ends as well as 
or better than noncompliance. 
The dynamic and transformational aspects of 
chronic illness necessitate modifying conventional 
bioethical interpretations of autonomy and the 
physician's duty to respect or enhance autonomy. 
The importance we have ascribed in chronic care 
to sustaining an intact, well-integrated self who is 
in control of, not controlled by, the illness, derives 
in a certain sense from the value of autonomy. Thus 
it is not the notion of autonomy per se that we 
find inadequate. The problem lies rather in the 
peculiarly individualistic interpretation often given 
to the concept of autonomy, in which autonomy 
means freedom from external limits or constraints. 
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In this perspective, the autonomous self is a 
disembodied self; it is independent of and prior to 
its social milieu and its bodily condition. 
This individualistic interpretation of autonomy is 
a philosophical fiction-an ideal of selfhood-
rather than a notion rooted in our lived experience. 
Still, it might be argued that this interpretation is 
useful as a heuristic conception that points us in 
the right direction morally. 
However, when this conception of autonomy is 
applied to chronic care as a guiding ethical principle, 
its shortcomings, even as a heuristic notion, become 
apparent Individualistic autonomy builds protective 
fences between the self and others; chronic care 
must restore the fabric of community and a web 
of mutual support and interdependency, beginning 
with the cooperative-not contractual-ties between 
patients and providers. Individualistic autonomy sets 
up a logical opposition between freedom and 
constraint, and between respecting a person and 
helping that person grow beyond the limits of his 
or her present self-understanding. 
In chronic care freedom and constraint, respect 
and guidance intertwine and become symbiotic. 
Protecting the patient's rights and interests is no 
less important in chronic care than it is in acute 
care, but it is essential to build trust and to avoid 
a climate of adversarialism. Chronic care is on its 
most solid ethical footing-and is therapeutically 
most effective-when both those receiving and those 
giving care recognize their common purpose, and 
when they both have the flexibility to move toward 
a deeper understanding of how best to preserve the 
integrity of the person in the face of chronic illness. 
Physicians and patients must both learn from and 
teach each other in the process of chronic care. 
There is time enough for this, and on an out-patient 
basis it should be possible to maintain the necessary 
continuity. 
Autonomy is not some a priori property of persons 
abstractly conceived. It is an achievement of selves 
who are socially embedded and physically embodied. 
This is perhaps the single greatest lesson to be 
learned from chronic illness. Autonomy is some- 
thing that grows out of the physician-patient 
relationship, not something that presides over it. And 
not out of this relationship only, but out of all aspects 
of life lived with-and in spite of-chronic illness 
and all facets of chronic care. 
The Limits of Family Obligations 
Ties of kinship, marriage, and sustained intimacy 
create special psychological and moral bonds in our 
lives. Families, a term virtually impossible to define 
precisely in American society at present, are 
composed of these ties and bonds, and so constitute 
a distinctive social space, a space where rules and 
expectations apply that are somewhat different from 
those in impersonal, public places and in transac- 
tions among strangers. 
Family life, and especially the moral obligations that 
family members have toward one another, is 
challenged by severe chronic illness in two ways: first 
by the burdens imposed on families by chronic care; 
and second by virtue of the fact that severe chronic 
illness in a family can pose a crisis for our traditional 
moral expectations concerning family life. 
Families now provide a principal source of social 
support and daily assistance for persons with severe 
debilitating chronic illness. Many of these people 
are homebound much of the time, and reside in 
the same household with one or more family 
members. Even those who live alone often have 
family members nearby who visit regularly to assist 
with cleaning, shopping, cooking, and other tasks 
that the chronically ill person is not able to perform 
unaided. In some instances the costs of such care, 
including financial expenses as well as time and 
emotional stress, can become overwhelming to the 
caregiver, and place a threatening strain on the 
family itself. 
Clearly, the chronically ill person, no matter how 
diacult or demanding, is not to blame for a situation 
like this. The burdens an illness imposes on the ill 
person and the family caregivers alike are artifacts 
of the social and cultural context in which they live. 
In the United States the burdens of chronic care on 
families are increased by the lack of public services 
and community facilities. These facilities could 
substitute for some aspects of family care and could 
promote a greater opportunity for independent living 
by the chronically ill. However, this lack of social 
support does not completely account for the dilemmas 
and burdens families experience in chronic care. 
Dilemmas also arise from the moral expectations family 
caregivers quite properly impose upon themselves, and 
the cultural ideal of what it means to be a good person 
in a family role-a good spouse, a good parent, a 
good son or daughter. 
Chronic illness forces us to consider how strongly 
we want to continue to adhere to these expectations 
and ideals, despite the very real costs and hardships 
they sometimes create when put into practice. Would 
our social morality be worse off if we lessened or 
abandoned them? Should we, in the name of 
individual autonomy both for the chronically ill and 
for family members, move toward replacing family- 
based care with such innovations as group homes, 
programs to encourage independent living, profes- 
sionalized home care services, and greater access 
to long-term care institutions for those needing only 
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unskilled nursing and "custodial" care? Should we 
as a society come to see chronic care as exclusively 
a public responsibility, and remove this function 
from the private lives of families altogether? 
The tempting and obvious response to these 
questions is, can't we have it both ways? As a practical 
matter, families will continue to play a key, but not 
exclusive role in the provision of chronic care. The 
political struggle for expanded benefits and better 
public financing for long-term care (both home and 
institutional) will continue, and voluntary community 
based services will continue to plug some gaps in 
public assistance and provide some respite and 
alternatives for weary family caregivers. But it is and 
will be an uneasy solution, with plenty of guilt and 
caprice to go around. 
It remains to be seen whether our society will 
be able to move toward a system that responds to 
the complex needs of both families and individuals. 
Earlier we noted the historical absence of any 
coordinated public policy on chronic illness, and 
nowhere is the lack of such a policy more apparent 
than in the ambivalent attitudes displayed concern- 
ing the role of families in chronic care. 
In the health care system, for example, confusing 
signals and conflicting trends abound. On the one 
hand, there is a trend toward deinstitutionalizing 
chronically ill patients who require sophisticated and 
even intensive forms of medical and nursing care. 
Severely disabled babies who were rescued from life- 
threatening complications by neonatal intensive care 
immediately after birth fall into this category, as do 
children who are chronically ventilator dependent 
or who require total parenteral nutrition. A new 
generation of medical technology has made these 
developments possible. They are also promoted by 
cost-containment considerations and by prevailing 
medical opinion that such children receive better 
care and are more likely to do well at home. 
A similar trend that places the responsibilities of 
care in the hands of family members is a spillover 
from institutional interaction between the hospital 
and the nursing home industries. Prospective 
payment systems give hospitals an incentive to 
discharge patients more quickly, and as a result 
nursing home beds are now occupied by more 
gravely and acutely ill residents than ever before. 
Nursing homes, in turn, are beginning to have their 
own financial incentives to give priority to skilled 
nursing rather than "custodial care," in a quest to 
obtain the highest levels of state Medicaid reimbur- 
sement. Unless new kinds of step-down residential 
care facilities are created, families in the future may 
not be able to turn to institutional care as a safety- 
valve option when the pressures of chronic care 
mount. 
At the same time, countervailing trends signal a 
decreasing reliance on family members in the 
provision of chronic care. In recent years more 
generous federal and state reimbursement for the 
cost of paid home care has stimulated the growth 
of the home health care industry, which has a sizable 
for-profit sector. This represents a major step toward 
the commercialization of services that family 
members-especially women-have traditionally 
performed on an altruistic basis. 
In addition, the private insurance industry is 
beginning to develop individual and group policies 
covering the costs of paid home care and long term 
institutional care. In the wake of the recent extension 
of Medicare coverage for long hospital stays, some 
support is also growing for a federally financed long 
term care entitlement program. Many questions 
about the adequacy and scope of these initiatives 
remain to be answered, but it does appear that 
insurance coverage for chronic illness and long term 
care is an idea whose time has finally come in the 
United States. Assuming that this coverage is truly 
comprehensive and widely available, it will make 
persons with chronic illness less dependent on their 
families. 
Finally, in the largely individualistic ethos of our 
society the self-denying and self-sacrificing caregiver 
does not receive much validation or moral support. 
Self-denial is viewed as a destructive characteristic- 
a pathological trap that family caregivers for the 
chronically ill often fall into-rather than as a 
praiseworthy virtue. 
These trends and attitudes reveal a considerable 
uncertainty about the proper role of the family in 
chronic care. Traditional values persist and family 
members often have no choice other than to assume 
these responsibilities; but at the same time families 
are increasingly demanding new options, which the 
government and the marketplace are slowly 
beginning to provide. 
We believe there is a clear and compelling need 
to provide more professional and community 
support to families caring for chronically ill 
members. These supports include publicly financed 
home care services with appropriate quality 
assurance and licensure mechanisms, respite care 
programs, so-called adult day care programs, 
counseling services, educational programs and 
support groups, and the like. No family can be 
expected to shoulder the entire responsibility of 
chronic care alone, and the considerable inequities 
that now exist in access to supporting care services 
should be eliminated as these services are developed 
and extended in the future. 
The question, as we see it, is not whether public 
and community services should be provided to 
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supplement family care, but what goals these family 
assistance programs should serve and what moral 
aspects of family relationships we want to preserve 
and strengthen as we publicly assist families with 
their caregiving responsibilities. For the danger is 
that assistance with responsibilities may subtly be 
transformed into denial of responsibilities. 
This danger can be avoided by creatively 
integrating family caregivers into coordinated 
networks of health care and social services, so that 
they won't feel either that they have abandoned 
chronically ill relatives, or that they must face the 
seemingly unending task of care alone. Such 
coordination represents a mixed public and private 
system that would both protect families from being 
overwhelmed and preserve the high moral expec- 
tations we have traditionally affirmed about the 
special obligations family membership confers. Such 
a system might better serve the needs of persons 
with chronic illness as well, because it is not clear 
that paid professional care can be a full substitute 
for family care that grows out of love and a special 
sense of moral commitment. 
Justice and Community 
The growing prevalence of chronic illness will 
necessarily lead to an extension of long term care 
and social service programs. Both acute and chronic 
illness in an aging society will lay claim to a 
substantial portion of our national resources, 
probably more than the eleven percent of GNP now 
devoted to health care expenditures. It is equally 
clear, however, that this expansion cannot be 
unlimited. Health care and social services will always 
have to be balanced with other pressing social needs 
like education, environmental protection, capital 
investment to improve industrial competitiveness, 
national defense, housing, and transportation. This, 
in turn, will create the need to set priorities within 
the health care sector, as is done now, but perhaps 
more explicitly on the basis of clear principles of 
justice and equity. 
Setting limits and priorities in health care takes 
two forms. First, priorities are established among 
persons or classes of persons by granting them 
differential access to health care. Second, priorities 
are set by the allocation of resources-funds for 
research and capital expenditures, manpower, third 
party reimbursements-among various kinds of 
health care services. The first influences who will 
receive care; the second affects the kind of care 
those who gain access to the system are most likely 
to find available. 
Throughout this essay we have emphasized the 
differences between acute and chronic care. When 
the issue of access to health care is raised, however, 
we believe there is no principled basis for differen- 
tiating between those who are acutely ill and those 
with chronic conditions. Various accounts may be given 
of whatjustice requires as a basis for distributing access 
to health care. Some theories claim that the provision 
of just and equitable access is a human right Others 
maintain that it is a societal obligation growing out 
of the needs and special vulnerability of those who 
are sick Still others hold that equitable access is 
required by a sense of communal solidarity and mutual 
respect. None of these theoretical accounts of justice 
provides any reason to believe that the rights, needs, 
or dignity of the chronically ill have less moral weight 
than those of the acutely ill. Of course, justice does 
not require that individuals should receive any and 
all health care they might conceivably want Equitable 
access does not mean unlimited access, either for acute 
or chronic care. But when policies are made that have 
the effect of rationing health care, they should not 
discriminate against persons with chronic illness. 
If principles of justice call for equity of access 
without regard to the chronicity of the health care 
need, however, they do not directly answer the 
question of what equitable access should be access 
to. Here the problems posed by acute care and 
chronic care do begin to diverge. In the first place, 
the scope as well as the duration of chronic care 
is broader than acute care. It involves not only 
medical treatment and professional medical and 
nursing services, but also a wide range of social, 
educational, counseling, and rehabilitative services. 
Proper coordination among these various compo- 
nents of chronic care-as well as attention to related 
issues such as housing, transportation, and employ- 
ment opportunities-is as important as access to 
these services per se. Even when adequate services 
are in place and are open to chronically ill persons 
who would benefit from them, these services are 
often scattered, hard to identify, and inconvenient 
to use. 
Moreover, the pattern of internal priorities within 
the health care system as a whole affects the type 
of care and services made available to chronic 
patients. In the United States today those priorities 
are decidedly skewed in favor of acute care 
interventions and technologically complex modes 
of diagnosis and treatment. The massive investments 
we have made and are making in these areas of 
medicine have certainly created a system well 
designed to respond to the acute episodes and life- 
threatening crises that punctuate the course of some 
chronic illnesses, and one with a powerful capacity 
to extend the length of life. 
However, our system does not give adequate 
attention to the distinctive goals of chronic care that 
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we have identified in this essay. Existing policies 
of health care financing, and priorities in medical 
education and research give short shrift to the quality 
of life goals of chronic care-negotiating with and 
through an illness, and sustaining integrity and 
intactness in the face of unavoidably disruptive 
symptoms and limitations. In order to meet the 
ethical challenges chronic illness poses to our health 
care system, it is not sufficient simply to seek 
prevention and cures for chronic diseases, nor to 
extend the duration of life lived with chronic illness 
via impressive acute interventions-as vital as these 
objectives are. Chronic care medicine must also 
create within itself a holistic, supportive environment 
where persons with chronic illness can construct 
their own lives in a meaningful way. Beyond this, 
chronic care medicine must be part of a broader 
effort to create that type of environment in society 
as a whole. 
Achieving equitable access to health care, setting 
reasonable limits to an otherwise insatiable and 
quixotic quest for perfect health, and reorienting 
our priorities in accordance with a revised under- 
standing of the ends of medicine-these are among 
the principal challenges of social justice in an aging 
society marked by widespread chronic illness. And 
they touch not justice only, but also our vision of 
public purpose and our sense of community. 
Chronic illness is a reminder of the universal 
frailty and uncertainty of the human condition. The 
presence of chronic illness in our midst is a moral 
challenge not simply because it threatens the 
interests or, as one philosopher has put it, the 
"normal opportunity range" of those who are 
chronically ill at any given time, but rather because 
it forces us to confront the question of how a good 
society should accommodate the expectable-but 
always unexpected-misfortunes that occur in 
everyone's life. The provision of care and social 
support for persons with chronic illness by 
temporarily well and able-bodied citizens reflects an 
acknowledgement of the links thatjoin the sick and 
the well, the young and the old in a community 
of common humanness and vulnerability. 
As we move toward new public policies in response 
to chronic illness, rights-based conceptions of social 
justice and individualistic conceptions of interests 
and autonomy should be tempered by a commun- 
itarian perspective such as this. 
Past experience with other health and social 
welfare policies in the United States indicates how 
difficult it will be to achieve this moral perspective. 
All too often when claims of special need have been 
publicly recognized and addressed, the ensuing 
programs have served to stigmatize the recipients 
of public assistance, to increase their dependency 
on professional service providers and bureaucratic 
institutions, or to identify them in the public mind 
as "special interests" that overburden government 
finances. 
Perpetually at risk of having benefits reduced or 
of paternalistic interference by professionals who 
determine eligibility or control access to services, 
recipients (or advocacy groups representing them) 
have responded by reasserting their rights. This is 
an understandable and perhaps unavoidable 
response in American political culture. But it 
nonetheless has the unhappy effect of pitting those 
with special needs against the broader society. It 
also perpetuates a situation in which different groups 
seeking special assistance must each make their 
claims seem more compelling than others in order 
to compete for limited public resources. 
It would be naive to expect that the development 
of new and expanded programs of chronic care will 
not be accompanied by the usual civic discourse 
of individual rights and the normal pluralistic politics 
of interest group competition. However, a thoughtful 
appreciation of the meaning of chronic illness as 
a human experience may at least serve to supple- 
ment, if not replace, this individualistic perspective 
of competing, mutually exclusive rights and interests. 
Setting priorities and making trade-offs among 
conflicting claims are vital aspects of public policy, 
to be sure. Analyzing problems in this way is not 
objectionable in and of itself. The danger arises 
when this is all we think about and talk about, for 
then civic discourse tends to lose sight of equally 
important communal goals of public policy-the 
cultivation of solidarity, reciprocity, and mutual aid; 
the identification of public goods; the nurturing of 
common endeavor. Chronic illness doggedly insists 
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